Speaking to Filipino reporters in Jakarta before he departed for Singapore, Ferdinand “Bongbong” Marcos Jr. said he could use the border agreement with Indonesia as a template to resolve a longstanding maritime territorial dispute with China.
In May 2014, when then Indonesian president Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono made a state visit to Manila, he signed a landmark deal to delineate the maritime borders of the two countries in the south. It took about two decades to negotiate to fix the overlapping exclusive economic zones between the two neighbors.
The Philippines and Indonesia have excellent bilateral relations, except for fishing rights in the southern Philippines when Jakarta often arrests local fishermen straying into its 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) in Sulawesi. Over the years, hundreds of local fishermen were thrown in prison for encroaching into Indonesian waters.
Marcos said he could probably use the border agreement as a template to resolve territorial issues with China.
“The delimitation talks were establishing a baseline since our EEZ overlaps with Indonesia,” Marcos told reporters in Jakarta. “It is now resolved. I think it is worthwhile to explore at the very least because it is one instance of this kind of discussion. We came to a conclusion and we came to a resolution. So we should try it. Now, hopefully it works. If it doesn’t work, we will try something else, but at least we have a beginning point. That’s how I see it.”
The president hopefully realizes that the Philippine-Indonesia border deal is not an excellent template to negotiate with China. The situation in the southern Philippines is entirely different from that of the volatile South China Sea.
The border dispute in Sulawesi, Celebes, and Sulu Seas is between Manila and Jakarta. Although Indonesia has been arresting local fishermen, it has not been as assertive as to ram local fishermen’s wooden boats with its steel-hulled ships.
Border-crossing stations had long been established between Manila and Jakarta before Yudhoyono agreed to sign an agreement fixing the two countries’ boundaries.
Marcos should also remember that the South China Sea issue is very complicated. The strategic waterway where about $3 trillion worth of seaborne goods pass every year was contested by five other states–Brunei, Malaysia, the Philippines, Taiwan and Vietnam.
The Philippines also has an overlapping EEZ with Malaysia and an unresolved territorial dispute over Sabah, which belonged to the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo.
Sabah is owned by the Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo but the Philippines has no sovereignty over the resource-rich eastern Malaysian state. A French court has awarded the heirs of the Sultan of Sulu and North Borneo nearly $15 billion for ownership of the state after Kuala Lumpur stopped paying the heirs an annual lease of P70,000 as a consequence of a failed invasion in 2013 by the sultan’s followers in Lahad Datu.
Perhaps, the Sabah issue is a more pressing border issue with Malaysia than the South China Sea.
The Philippines has not delineated its baselines or its boundaries in that corner of the country because of the Sabah claim. The border dispute with Malaysia is a ticklish issue.
Going back to settling the maritime dispute with China, it is wrong for the president to use the Indonesian agreement as a template to resolve the issue with China.
The Philippines has no overlapping EEZ with China. China’s claim in the South China Sea is excessive and is beyond its EEZ from its territory in Hainan province.
The 2016 ruling made the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague clearly stated that China’s occupied features in the Spratly do not generate a 200-nautical mile EEZ and will not overlap with the Philippines’s EEZ.
Some of the features it had occupied only had 12 nautical miles of territorial waters. The seven artificial islands China had created did not generate EEZs and would, therefore, not overlap with the Philippines’s EEZ.
The Philippines has sovereign rights over Reed Bank, which is within the country’s 200-nautical-mile EEZ. China cannot claim sovereignty and sovereign rights over the Reed Bank because it is beyond its 200-nautical-mile EEZ under the 1982 United Nations’ Convention on the Law of the Sea (Unclos).
China’s sovereignty and EEZ claim over the Reed Bank is illegal and without basis under Unclos. Therefore, there is no overlapping EEZ with China and thus, the Indonesian model for border agreement does not apply.
Pursuing Marcos’ delimitation talks with China would only recognize Beijing’s illegal sovereignty and EEZ claim in the Reed Bank and in the Spratly group.
The Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) hopefully would advise Marcos that his idea of using the Indonesia border agreement as a template to resolve the maritime dispute with China is flawed and inaccurate.
The Philippines should stand by the 2016 arbitral ruling victory and invoke it in negotiating with China to resolve the maritime territorial dispute. The Philippines has all the legal rights to the Reed Bank. It has all the rights to explore and exploit oil-and-gas and other resources within its 200-nautical-mile EEZ.
Marcos should not surrender an inch of Philippine territory and sovereign rights in the EEZ.
He should consult with the DFA and maritime experts before inviting China to similar delimitation talks. He might be legitimizing Beijing’s illegal sovereignty and EEZ claim on the Reed Bank and Spratlys.